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Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, many 
scholars and observers of European integration were proclaiming that the French-German 
“engine”  of  Europe  had  come  to  an  end.  The  political  legitimacy  of  French-German 
initiatives was contested by coalitions of smaller member states and the ‘new Europe’ was 
calling for new leadership dynamics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt crisis 
provided dramatic evidence that no alternative to the Franco-German partnership has yet to 
emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear 
to have remained the basic dynamic of integration. However, unlike in the past, agreements 
on steps forward have proven to be particularly difficult.  This is largely due to these 
countries’ contrasting political economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices. 
The Eurozone crisis itself was ‘read’ very differently by the two countries, which 
also prescribed different solutions on different timetables.  As the crisis initially unfolded, 
French leaders continued to prescribe neo-Keynesian stimulus; described the problem as 
one  of  mutual  responsibility  resulting  from  imbalances  between  deficit  countries  (read 
Southern Europe) and surplus countries (read Germany); recommended deeper integration 
through greater gouvernance économique (economic governance) along with a range of 
policy innovations; and preached solidarity in response to the Greek debt crisis together 
with a quick bailout to stop escalating market concerns beginning in January 2010. By 
contrast,  the  German  leadership  delayed  action,  first  pushing  Greece  to  solve  its  own 
problems with a discourse about public profligacy and ‘lazy Greeks;’ and only when the 
crisis was ready to explode did it agree to a loan for Greece at punitive market rates on May 
3, 2010, followed by a new loan guarantee mechanism—pushed by France and even a 
telephone  call  from  US  President  Obama—on  the  weekend  of  May  9-10,  as  market 
contagion threatened other European countries (the infamously named ‘PIGS’—Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece, and Spain—the additional ‘I’ for Italy comes a year later).
  On this historic 
occasion,  a  deal  was  brokered  in  which  France  got  some  of  the  political  (economic) 
institutions and policy actions it most wanted, including a bailout for Greece and a loan 
guarantee  mechanism—the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF)—for  countries 
under  threat,  in  exchange  for  accepting  German  political  economic  policies  and 
philosophies. These included enforcing ordo-liberal macroeconomic principles of austerity 
budgets  across  Europe,  accepting  the  creation  of  a  further  treaty-based  loan  guarantee 
mechanism,  the  European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM),  and  agreeing  to  reinforce  the 	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Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (SGP),  giving  it  more  teeth  through  fines  and  sanctions. 
Subsequent episodes in the saga of the Eurozone crisis reiterated this basic pattern. 
Paradoxically, the compromise between the two powers has been evaluated very 
differently by their European counterparts as well as their own national publics. Sarkozy’s 
role in the crisis was seen in much more positive light than that of Merkel.  Whereas 
Sarkozy was viewed as something of a ‘White Knight’ riding to the rescue of Greece and 
Eurozone countries throughout Europe, Merkel was pictured as Europe’s new ‘Iron Lady’ 
outside Germany, imposing hardship on Greece as well as other European countries. This is 
because  at  home,  the  Chancellor  had  to  please  a  public  highly  resistant  to  financial 
solidarity at the expense of the German taxpayers that would come without severe austerity 
for the ‘PIGS’. In contrast, the French public generally accepted Sarkozy’s turn to austerity 
and  the  increasingly  stringent  ‘pacts’  that  accompanied  it.    Eventually,  the  French  and 
German discourse converged to a certain extent, as they agreed to more solidarity and 
institutional integration along with austerity, but emphasised different aspects in order to 
legitimise the ‘deal’ towards their respective public opinion.  
So how do we explain these differential views of French and German leadership in 
the crisis, both outside and inside their countries?  Part of the answer naturally requires 
setting  these  leaders  in  the  context  of  long-standing  national  economic  and  political 
traditions, considering their particular perceptions of national economic interest at the time 
of the crisis as well as of political interest—related to electoral considerations.  But another 
important component has to do with the very structure of decision-making, with multiple 
actors at multiple levels.   
At the EU level, the main tension concerns the articulation between supranational 
and intergovernmental politics, and the ways in which the various actors have responded to 
events.  The key supranational actors in the Eurozone governance architecture, the EU 
Commission, charged with oversight of Eurozone activity and member-state adherence to 
the Stability and Growth Pact, and the European Central Bank (ECB), charged to maintain 
the stability of the euro, have naturally sought to carry out their respective duties while not 
only ensuring against threats to their prerogatives  but also taking advantage of windows of 
opportunity  that  would  enable  them  to  help  solve  the  crisis.    Both  institutional  actors, 
however, are limited by the fact that major decisions about any significant change in the 
governance of the Eurozone can only be decided by the member states—and in particular 
France and Germany.  As the major member-state actors, however, France and Germany 
themselves have to take into account their previous ‘history-making’ grand bargains at the 	 ﾠ
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EU level, including their ‘certain idea of Europe (Parsons 2003) that led to the creation of 
the common currency.
1 At the same time, though, they also have to deal with the responses 
of national publics and their own electoral prospects.    
The national level, in other words, is as important to any compromise solution as is 
the supranational.  This suggests that Robert Putnam’s (1988) classic discussion of the two-
level game in international relations has great relevance for our case.   What we will show, 
however, is that rather than seeing this as a two level game, in which the two levels remain 
largely  separate,  the  EU’s  Eurozone  negotiations  are  better  viewed  as  a  simultaneous 
double game.  In this game, moreover, rather than using rational choice institutionalism to 
model the interest-based calculations of ‘rational’ state actors, we argue that a discursive 
institutionalist approach (Schmidt 2008) provides greater value-added to our understanding 
of how EU leaders perceived their interests as well as achieved compromises. Discursive 
institutionalism  considers  both  the  substantive  content  of  ideas  and  the  discursive 
interactions through which agents (re)construct and convey their ideas about interests and 
values  in  given  institutional  contexts  on  an  on-going  basis.  These  occur  through  a 
‘coordinative discourse’ with other (supranational) policymakers in leaders’ efforts to reach 
agreement and in a ‘communicative discourse’ with the public—both their own national 
publics and the European public more generally.    
To elucidate all of this, the paper analyses the ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders 
while tracing their discursive interactions against changing background conditions since the 
European debt crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 until the last measures taken 
in  2012  before  the  French  Presidential  elections.  The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a 
systematic  corpus  of  press  conferences  and  media  interviews  by  Nicolas  Sarkozy  and 
Angela  Merkel  after  European  summits.  It  is  complemented  by  a  number  of  press 
interviews  (including  some  given  by  their  respective  Finance  Ministers)  and  important 
speeches in that same period of time.  
 
EXPLAINING  THE  DYNAMICS  OF  AGREEMENT  IN  EU  MULTI-LEVEL 
POLITICS 
 
A risky simultaneous double game 
As  European  integration  has  increasingly  blurred  the  demarcation  lines  between 
domestic  and  foreign  policy,  the  articulation  between  domestic  politics  and 
intergovernmental negotiations has become increasingly important for any understanding of 	 ﾠ
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governance and democracy in the EU. Paradoxically – partly because comparativists tend to 
concentrate on the former while international relations specialists deal with the latter – the 
processes of articulation remain under-researched and under-theorised with regard to EU 
integration. In the 1980s’, R. Putnam (1988) put forward the famous metaphor of the two-
level game. His argument was that, while negotiating international treaties, national leaders 
have to seek agreement at two different tables, which implies different sets of preferences at 
the national level on one hand, and at the international level on the other. These two arenas 
are presumed to mutually influence each other, since the overlap of the two preference sets 
determines the possibility of ratifying an agreement. The main implication is therefore that 
moves in international politics will mostly be brokered and ratified if they provide for 
domestic benefits.  
Other scholars have extended this analysis to the role of domestic politics in EU 
integration.  Andrew Moravcsik (1997) put forward a liberal intergovernmentalist account 
of international relations in which states define their preferences on the basis of domestic 
society  (or  some  subset  thereof).  With  regard  to  the  ideational  variant  of  liberalism  in 
particular,  he  suggests  that  State  preferences  stand  for  a  national  identity  composed  of 
views  about  the  legitimate  social  order,  i.e  preferences  about  the  scope  of  the  nation 
(citizenship and borders), commitment to particular political institutions, and ideas about 
the  nature  of  redistribution  (Moravcsik  1997).  State  behaviour  understood  as  the 
management of international interdependence is then geared toward gains on the basis of 
these preferences. Building on this approach, German scholars have more recently claimed 
the  “domestication”,  i.e  a  new  orientation  towards  domestic  societal  preferences  and 
identities, of the EU policy of Germany (Harnisch 2006) and France (Schild 2009). Here 
again,  the  central  argument  suggests  a  subordination  of  foreign  policy  to  domestic 
preferences. Both approaches are useful in the sense that they point to crucial aspects of the 
articulation between domestic and EU politics. While the two-level game metaphor stresses 
the interactions between the two arenas, ideational liberal intergovernmentalism stresses the 
importance of societal preferences and long-established identities. However, both theories 
also have a serious drawback: they assume the existence of two separate realms of fixed 
preferences that interact with each other. Those preferences tend to be reified and pictured 
as homogeneous (especially in the liberal approach) and the formation of preference sets 
seems to happen at different moments. Moreover, both imply that international agreements 
are mainly geared towards the satisfaction of domestic preferences, hence the two-stage 
nature of the process. 	 ﾠ
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This is where the uniqueness of European politics must be taken into account. In the 
EU, we argue, the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations must be understood as a 
simultaneous double game, rather than a two-level game. The domestic and the EU spheres 
of preference formation do not interact with each other, they inter-penetrate each other. 
Preferences at national and EU level are therefore co-constitutive. Democratic legitimacy 
results  less  and  less  from  the  preservation  or  reproduction  of  established  national 
preferences, and more and more from the ability to re-configure and re-negotiate those 
preferences in the context of exacerbated interdependence. The “game” therefore should be 
understood less as the overlapping of preference sets and win solutions than as a discursive 
game of real-time deliberation and contestation.  
In today’s EU, political leaders and decision-makers do not only have to address 
their national constituencies; they also need to speak to other European audiences in order 
to convince them that the policy option they advocate is not the mere defence of a national 
preference but serves the collective ‘good’ of the EU as a whole. During the crisis of the 
Eurozone, not just national leaders acting in their EU capacity but also national finance 
ministers  like  the  French  Minister  for  economics,  Christine  Lagarde,  and  her  German 
counterpart, Wolfgang Schäuble, have sought to reach their neighbour constituencies with 
interviews in the press. Interdependence among the member countries in the EU has gone 
so far that agreement is no longer an option: it has become a necessity. As a result, it is not 
just that the possibility of an agreement is at stake – as in the two-level game theory – but 
also  the  electoral  fate  of  national  leaders.  If  they  prove  to  be  unable  to  legitimise  an 
agreement brokered at the EU level, national leaders will have to bear the political costs of 
popular resentment. The referenda for the ratification of EU treaties are the opposite of this. 
They represent a counter-example to the simultaneous double game since they do feature a 
rigid two-step process where treaties bargained in intergovernmental conferences are then 
submitted to popular consent. This was the case of the rejection of the Constitutional treaty. 
By contrast, in the simultaneous double game of policy change in the EU, national elites 
have the crucial role of bridging the gap between the management of interdependence and 
of national preferences and identities.  
   How  member-states  have  come  to  hold,  maintain,  and  change  their  EU-related 
identities, visions, and discourses depends in large measure on the interactive processes of 
discussion, debate, deliberation, and contestation among and between elites and citizens over 
time.    National  political  elites,  who  simultaneously  act  as  EU  policymakers  (henceforth 
termed European elites), have played a key role in articulating visions of the EU that have 	 ﾠ
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had  a  major  influence  on  public  perceptions,  especially  during  the  early  years  of  the 
‘permissive consensus’ up until the 1990s (see, e.g., Schmidt 2006). Since then, these elites’ 
discourses  often  reflect  as  they  respond  to  the  greater  contestation  coming  from  an 
increasingly ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), in which divisions over the 
EU  as  well  as,  more  generally,  between  more  open  and  closed  views  of  Europe  and 
citizenship have been growing (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2008).  The media has also played a 
major role in ‘mediating’ between elites and citizens, and in particular in shaping public 
opinion on the EU through what and how they report and comment on the EU (Koopmans 
and Statham 2010; Risse 2010). Social movements also play an increasingly significant role 
in influencing public opinion and leaders, in particular on issues of great political salience, 
whether  across  member-states  as  in  the  case  of  the  mobilization  against  the  Bolkestein 
directive (Crespy 2012) or within member-states in referendum campaigns about EU treaties. 
European elites’ discourses have also, naturally, been strongly influenced by past elites’ ideas 
and commitments, whether because of the ‘rhetorical entrapment’ engendered by previously 
accepted policy obligations (Schimmelfennig 2001) or the ideational trap resulting from the 
institutionalised ideas of their predecessors(Parsons 2003).  
 
A discursive institutionalist analysis 
To  say  that  European  elites  may  be  constrained  by  past  EU  or  national  level 
discourses  and  actions,  however,  does  not  mean  that  they  end  up  caught  in  the  path-
dependence of institutionalized ideas, as historical institutionalists might argue, locked into 
parroting the outcomes of the winning political coalition’s expressed interests, as rational 
choice institutionalists might suggest, or even condemned to reproducing national cultural 
and identity frames, as sociological institutionalists could seem to suppose. European elites, 
in particular when it comes to supranational policy articulation and action, still have a certain 
degree of freedom of manoeuvre in the construction of their ideas and the articulation of their 
discourse.  Certainly,  their  freedom  is  greatest  when  they  are  the  ones  to  construct  the 
founding ideas of a given discourse, as was the case for General Charles de Gaulle, Konrad 
Adenauer,  Altiero  Spinelli,  and  others.  But  subsequent  leaders  also  have  a  modicum  of 
choice, even if this must follow to some extent the flow of past ideas and discourse—if only 
to build legitimacy and ensure resonance for the public.  
The analytic framework used herein is ‘discursive institutionalism,’ which analyses 
the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional 
context  (Schmidt  2006;  Schmidt  2008).  In  European  Studies,  this  approach  is  closest  to 	 ﾠ
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identity and discourse analyses (Diez 2001, Risse 2010).  The difference is that it is more 
explicit about the need to focus on the dynamics of change in ideas through the interactive 
processes  of  discourse,  and  more  concerned  about  situating  these  in  formal  institutional 
context (in addition to the ideational one).  With regard to the EU, that context is a multi-
level system consisting of a ‘coordinative’ discourse of elite policy construction at the EU 
level and a ‘communicative’ discourse between elites and the public involving national level 
policy  discussion,  contestation,  and  legitimization.  Complicating  this  is  the  fact  that 
policymakers can use an ostensibly communicative discourse to their own general publics—
in speeches or in interviews in national or the foreign press - to simultaneously signal their 
positions to fellow policymakers, ahead of coordinative negotiation meetings.  By the same 
token,  they  may  say  one  thing  behind  closed  doors  in  the  coordinative  negotiations, 
something  else  to  their  national  press  as  they  emerge  from  their  meetings,  as  a 
communication to their own constituencies.  Legitimacy issues often arise when there is a 
significant  lack  of  congruence  between  the  coordinative  discourse  at  EU  level  and  the 
communicative discourse at the national level. This may come at the national level, as the 
press and opinion leaders may complain that national leaders have not been honest about the 
EU commitments they may have made, or at the EU level, as EU leaders may complain that a 
fellow leader has gone back on EU level promises in national speeches or actions.  
National institutional settings also represent both opportunities and constraints for 
political leaders when trying to persuade at home. These institutional settings can be stylised 
as  ‘simple’  polities  in  which  decision-making  tends  to  be  channelled  through  a  single 
authority, as in countries like France, which are unitary states with statist policymaking and 
majoritarian  representation  systems,  or  as  ‘compound’  polities  in  which  decision-making 
tends  to  be  more  dispersed,  as  in  Germany,  which  are  federal  states  with  corporatist 
policymaking  and  proportional  representation  systems.    In  Germany,  with  its  compound 
polity  containing  many  veto  players  –  in  particular  the  Bundestag  (lower  house  of 
Parliament) or the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the Constitutional Court) – the political system 
requires a ‘thick’ coordinative discourse among the wide range of national actors with a say 
in decision-making in order to reach agreement.  In France, by contrast, with its simple polity 
in which top down decisions by a restricted governing elite are the rule, making for a ‘thin’ 
coordinative  discourse,  communicative  discourses  to  the  general  public  are  much  more 
elabourate—and necessary, since disagreements generally turn into mediatised public debates 
and often also spill out into the street, if unions and social movements mobilise and protest 
(Schmidt 2006).  	 ﾠ
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Therefore, European leaders’ positions cannot be explained without also considering 
institutions and electoral politics, and in particular the extent to which, in this simultaneous 
double game, considerations other than those involved in solving the Eurozone crisis, such as 
getting re-elected or maintaining one’s majority, play an important role.  To illustrate, the 
German  leader’s  stance  on  the  Greek  bailout  cannot  be  understood  without  also 
understanding the compound polity in which she operates, in which ministries such as that of 
Finance have considerable independence, in which the Bundesbank and the Constitutional 
Court in Karlsruhe are fully independent, and in which frequent regional elections can change 
the majority in the Bundesrat (second chamber).  
In Germany, the heated discussions about the first emergency measures for rescuing 
Greece took place in the run-up to the regional election in the significant region of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The government parties were going down in the polls and ended 
losing more than 10% of the votes compared to 2005. As result, the Chancellor’s party, the 
CDU lost control of the Land, to the benefit of a red-green coalition. NRW was only the first 
in a series of election defeats. In March 2011, the CDU lost the rich Baden-Württemberg, 
which had been a CDU’s stronghold for 58 years. In the Bremen election in May 2011, the 
CDU lost over 5% of the votes while the SPD and the Greens were victoriously re-elected 
with enhanced scores. Merkel’s initial discourse, about ‘lazy Greeks’ who needed to put their 
own house in order, while she was protecting German savings, made it very difficult for her 
to legitimate her switch in discourse, to then insist on national TV that ‘the future of Europe 
depended on it [the Euro]’ and ‘it was essential to maintain the stability of the Euro’. The 
discourse rang hollow, while the turnabout angered numbers of her supporters, including the 
influential  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung.  Part  of  the  explanation  for  her  increasing 
insistence on more stringent institutional mechanisms, automatically applied, also has to do 
with the attempt to demonstrate to a disenchanted electorate that their savings would be safe, 
and that the Eurozone countries would become more and more like Germany. In contrast, 
Sarkozy has none of the problems of the institutional and electoral problems of his German 
counterpart, given that France is a ‘simple’ polity with tremendous concentration of power 
and authority in the president, which has only increased under his presidency as a result of 
constitutional reform.   
Drawing from various conceptualizations in different strands of the literature focusing 
on the role of ideas and discourse, the chapter explores three dimensions of public discourse 
about the Eurocrisis, focused on economics, institutions, and identity. In all three dimensions, 
we consider the cognitive and normative frames contained in EU leaders’ discourse, which 	 ﾠ
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may be conceived of in a number of different ways at different levels of generalization (Hall 
1993; Sabatier 1998; Schmidt 2008; Mehta 2010). Putting these together, we identify three 
levels, including:  1) policy ideas related to policy measures and solutions, both economic 
(for instance the EFSF) and institutional (the budgetary ‘golden rule’); 2) programmatic ideas 
related to larger policy paradigms (for instance, convergence or regulation) related to broader 
economic  philosophies  (Keynesianism  or  ordo-liberalism);  and  3)  norms,  values  and 
identities  (for  instance,  stability  or  solidarity).  In  the  latter  category,  drawing  from  the 
framing  literature  (Hunt,  Benford  et  al.  1994),  we  also  consider  how  political  leaders 
conceive of Europe, the position of their country in Europe as well as the role of various 
institutions. Here, attention will be paid to frames delineating boundaries between us (the 
French? The Europeans?) and them (the so-called PIGS? The speculators?) 
The following sections present a diachronic and comparative analysis of French and 
German  discourses  over  the  two  sequences  and  at  the  level  of  institutional  and  policy 
solutions, economic paradigms and philosophies, and norms and identities. 
 
 
POLICY  AND  INSTITUTIONAL  SOLUTIONS:  ACTIVATING  SOLIDARITY, 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING AUSTERITY 
In the course of 2010, France and Germany eventually agree to set up two financial 
instruments: the EFSF with the first Greek bailout in May, and then in the fall, the ESM.   
With  both,  German  leaders  kept  insisting,  both  in  the  coordinative  discourse  with  their 
European partners and in the communicative discourse to the German public, that they would 
not agree to such funds, until they did.  At a press conference in the fall (on September 16, 
2010), for example, both Merkel and her Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, maintained 
that they would not agree to any extension of the EFSF to a permanent fund. By December of 
that same year, they agreed to the EMS at the EU level. 
What  is  clear  is  that  Germany  mainly  followed  France  with  regard  to  policy 
solutions—albeit reluctantly, and with much delay.  This comes out clearly from a systematic 
analysis of the press conferences and press interviews of Merkel and Sarkozy for the year. 
Graph 1 demonstrates that whereas French leaders advocated establishing not only the two 
funds but also such solutions as Eurobonds or enhanced budgetary oversight, Angela Merkel 
was stuck on already existing, but inefficient, policy solutions such as respecting the rules 
enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact or even investing in research contained in the 
Lisbon strategy.  At the same time, all the think-tanks were abuzz with discussions of how to 	 ﾠ
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create a European Monetary Fund or to make Eurobonds work, while major economists, 
opinion makers, and even government officials, including Schäuble himself, published op-eds 
in major newspapers on various mechanisms for financial solidarity.  But none of this had an 
impact  on  Germany’s  position.  We  observe  a  similar  pattern  with  regard  to  institutional 
solutions.  Although  Germany  finally  embraced  France’s  long-standing  demand  for 
‘gouvernance  économique,’  that  is,  for  an  economic  government  that  would  oversee  the 
Eurozone, it did so on condition that this meant strengthening the sanctioning mechanisms 
for the countries that would not be able to abide by the budgetary rules. The French went 
along with this with some reluctance, in particular because these were increasingly focused 
on automatic financial sanctions (see the French President’s Press conference on March 25, 
2010).    Moreover,  Merkel  repeatedly  evoked  the  idea  that  the  existing  treaties  forbade 
bailouts in the Eurozone.  And finally, once the bailout and loan guarantee had been agreed, 
Angela Merkel missed few opportunities to remind her European partners of her country’s 
decision to anchor a budgetary ‘Golden Rule’ (Schuldenbremse, literally debt brake) in the 
German Constitution (PC 10.05.2010, Le Monde 19.05.2010). 
 
Graph 1 about here 
 
In the sequence of institutional consolidation in 2011, the respective French and 
German  discourses  on  policy  solutions  did  not  change  much.  The  German  Chancellor, 
while fully endorsing the ESFS and the EMS, developed a complex set of arguments to 
explain how they might function together. She also continued to refer to the stability and 
growth pact and the need to invest in research in order to boost competitiveness. On the 
French side, Nicolas Sarkozy moved on to the advocacy of fiscal integration, in particular 
with regard to tax competition, an idea that was followed more or less by Angela Merkel.   
 
By  contrast,  discourse  on  the  institutional  policy  solutions  changed  markedly  in 
2011. The issue of automatic sanctions was more salient in the French discourse because 
Nicolas Sarkozy had to justify his consent to automatic sanctioning mechanisms as well as 
the role of the EU Commission in the monitoring of the excessive deficit procedure. In 
addition,  he  very  often  mentioned  the  role  of  the  new  economic  government  of  the 
Eurozone  in  order  to  stress  that  the  long-standing  French  demand  was  satisfied  in  the 
course  of  Franco-German  negotiations.  This  theme  remained  marginal  for  the  German 
Chancellor.  	 ﾠ
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Graph 2 about here 
 
The newest, most salient theme in this sequence of the crisis was the ‘golden rule’ 
for budgetary discipline. Both France and Germany converged on this theme, as well as on 
the idea of enshrining it in a new intergovernmental treaty. While this mechanism was 
inspired by Germany, Nicolas Sarkozy had already advocated introducing it in the French 
Constitution  since  early  2010.  Polls  showed  that  the  French  President  had  been  quite 
successful in communicating the new orientation towards austerity to the French electorate. 
In August 2011, a poll confirmed that a majority of the French approved the introduction of 
the “golden rule” into the French Constitution
2.  
 
ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHIES AND PARADIGMS: CONVERGENCE TOWARDS 
GERMAN ORDNUNGSPOLITK 
 
Ordo-liberalism  is  a  German  invention.    It  was  forged  in  the  1950s  under  the 
leadership of Ludwig Erhard, with the philosophical ideas underlying the paradigm informing 
not just the Bundesbank but also, later, the ECB, which absorbed its ideology.  The paradigm 
itself  was  developed  by  a  discourse  coalition  led  in  the  early  post-war  period  by  Alfred 
Müller-Armack,  the  entrepreneurial  actor  who  articulated  the  arguments  that  convinced 
policy actors, political actors, and then the public of the necessity and appropriateness of this 
idea (Lehmbruch 2001). It has remained a pervasive and distinctive form of neo-liberalism 
conceived as an alternative to Keynesianism that has also, to a certain extent, underpinned the 
German  concept  of  social  market  economy  (Ptak  2004).    The  German  ‘social  market 
economy’ which emerged after much political struggle during the 1950s was a compromise 
accepted by conservatives and social democrats alike that consecrated a state that would 
govern the economy according to ordo-liberal economic principles while at the same time 
‘enabling’ corporatist management and labour coordination of wages and work conditions 
(Streeck 1997).  
 
Post-war Germany, as a result, adopted a political economic philosophy and program 
that was the direct opposite of that of France’s post-war dirigisme, in which an interventionist 
state was much more actively engaged in both macroeconomic steering and microeconomic 
industrial policy.   France’s dirigiste political economic philosophy also began in the 1930s, 	 ﾠ
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as the brainchild of technocratic elites of the right and even, in some cases, of the far right 
who were influential during the last days of the Third Republic and the Vichy regime as well 
as the Liberation era (Nord 2010). This pattern of state ‘voluntarism’ has persisted, despite 
the fact that since the 1980s, post-war Keynesianism and state dirigisme gave way to neo-
liberal  reform  in  which  the  state  engineered  the  ‘dirigiste’  end  of  dirigisme  through 
liberalization, privatization, and deregulation (Schmidt 1996; 2012). 
 
Nonetheless, the deep-seated idea of the legitimacy of strong state interventionism 
helps explain why a Conservative French President—who had embraced neo-liberalism for 
the previous two years of his mandate—would be ready to jump back in with a more state-
led, Keynesian approach to the 2008 crisis. A very different set of deep-seated ideas about the 
value of the ordo-liberal ‘Culture of Stability,’ which had continued largely unchanged since 
the early post-war period, helps explain why a Conservative German Chancellor would resist 
any such state action in response to the 2008 crisis.  And this also helps explain Chancellor 
Merkel’s resistance to President Sarkozy’s push for more active and immediate response to 
the Greek crisis as of 2010.   
 
Thus,  graph  3  suggests  that  part  of  the  reason  for  the  seemingly  interminable 
discussions over the exact conditions for the Greek bail out can be further explained by the 
fact  that  Sarkozy  and  Merkel  focused  on  different  underlying  policy  paradigms  and 
philosophies for the ESFS and the EMS. Whereas the French leaders’ discourse continued to 
highlight the importance of the economic convergence of member-states, in keeping with the 
original ideas behind the European Monetary Union, German leaders used the key words of 
the ordo-liberal frame, austerity and competitiveness, while adding conditionality as the way 
in which to ensure that member-states with excessive debts commit themselves to austerity 
budgets to reduce public deficits, under the supervision of the EU authorities.  The leitmotiv 
of  the  German  political  establishment’s  discourse  was  control  over  public  finance,  as 
signalled by the use of a wide range of terms, all expressing this idea in the German language 
– Haushaltsdiziplin,  Haushaltskonsolidierung, Defizitkontrolle, Sparkurs, etc
3. These terms, 
moreover, are all closely associated with the concept of competitiveness, which was over-
used in every speech of the German Chancellor, as in the following quote: 
“As  a  matter  of  fact,  and  this  has  been  acknowledged  everywhere,  the 
competitiveness  of  the  various  Euro-countries  is  different,  and  we  are  helping 
ourselves to become the most competitive regions in the world if we pay attention to 	 ﾠ
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the strengthening and the improvement of our overall competitiveness. We need to be 
careful that it does not lead to excessive divergences within the Eurozone, but rather 
that we grow together thanks to better competitiveness” (PC 04.02.2011). 
 
Moreover, although the Pact adopted in March 2010 was named the ‘Pact for the Euro,’ the 
Germans  often  referred  to  it  as  the  ‘Pact  for  Competitiveness’  (PC  04.02.2011,  PC 
11.03.2011).  And subsequent to the May agreement, Merkel implicitly linked the push for 
zero  deficit  to  increased  competitiveness,  while  she  strongly  associated  the  ‘solidity’  of 
public finances with austerity measures across Europe (Le Monde 19.05.2010).   
 
Graph 3 about here 
 
Notably, with the May agreement on the Greek bailout and the EFSF, the French 
President embraced to a large extent the ordo-liberal framing of the crisis. That said, Sarkozy 
nonetheless  endeavoured  to  maintain  a  discursive  balance  between  the  invocation  of 
austerity,  on  one  hand,  and  of  growth  and  employment,  on  the  other.    By  contrast,  the 
German  discourse  had  no  place  at  all  for  the  main  French  alternative  frame,  that  of  a 
necessary policy convergence within the Eurozone.  
 
This constituted a clever discursive strategy by French political leaders. On the one 
hand,  they  strongly  converged  towards  the  competitiveness  program  and  framing.  In 
February 2011, Christine Lagarde, who was the French Minister for Finance at that time, 
gave an interview to the Spiegel seeking to persuade the German political establishment and 
public of the French commitment to increasing competitiveness and stability. On the other 
hand,  besides  competitiveness,  Nicolas  Sarkozy  avoided  evoking  the  austerity  frame 
nationally, emphasizing instead the idea of policy convergence within the Eurozone, which 
was in tune with the French vision of a core Europe. He also talked more about growth, 
employment  and  the  regulation  of  finance  as  complementary  references  to  Keynesian 
policy. In contrast, Angela Merkel used competitiveness, along with austerity, as her main 
discursive  frames,  with  convergence,  growth  and  employment  and  conditionality  as 
secondary frames. Regulation was absent from her discourse in this period of time. 
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By the end of the period under study, however, President Sarkozy was more willing 
to see convergence rather than competitiveness as the main goal of the Pact for the Euro. 
The framing discrepancy was acknowledged by the French President:  
‘We have also changed the name, it is ‘Pact for the Euro in favour of competitiveness 
and convergence’. This allowed us to put an end to the debate between those who 
were for convergence and those who were for competitiveness’ (PC 11.03.2011) 
 
Meanwhile, the competitiveness frame also permeated the French discourse to a significant 
extent (cf. Christine Lagarde in Spiegel 14.02.2011). The main French achievement in terms 
of  convergence  was  the  setting  up  of  the  so-called  economic  government  of  the  EU,  a 
gathering of the Eurozone leaders. While the Germans were stressing convergence in terms 
of wages (with the end of indexation on inflation
4), Sarkozy emphasised a move that France 
had advocated for a long time, namely integration in fiscal policy with first steps towards 
harmonization.  
 
NORMS AND IDENTITIES: SOLIDARITY VS STABILITY 
 
While the cognitive arguments in the German and French leaders’ discourse were 
reasonably  well-developed,  the  normative  arguments  were  strikingly  thin,  with  scant 
reference to values, especially as far as Germany was concerned. Whereas French leaders 
repeatedly talked of solidarity, the best German leaders could come up with was ‘stability,’ 
as Graph 4 demonstrates.  Stability itself is a traditional frame inherited from the monetarist 
spirit  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  for  which  the  core  task  of  the  ECB  is  to  ensure  price 
stability (low inflation) while the rules for EMU are enshrined in the Pact of Stability and 
Growth. For the Germany, in other words, stability of the currency has been elevated to a 
moral value, as a result of history and collective memory.   
 
Graph 4 about here 
 
The German Chancellor’s value-based discourse on stability stands in contrast to the 
French  President’s  emphasis  on  solidarity,  in  particular  towards  Greece  and,  more 
generally, within the Eurozone, as the main justification for setting up the EFSF and the 
EMS.  Sarkozy also appealed to the grand narrative of EU integration: ‘The Euro is Europe, 
Europe  means  peace  on  the  continent’  (PC  08.05.2010).  In  stressing  the  principle  of 	 ﾠ
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solidarity, the French banking interests that were to benefit most from a bailout for Greece
5 
were discursively absent from the construction of the French position, which helped make it 
more legitimate.  This was also, one might add, true for the German discourse, in which 
citizens’ interests were at the forefront of the discourse, as the German government insisted 
time  and  again  that  it  was  most  concerned  about  engaging  the  German  taxpayers’ 
responsibility  in  the  financial  rescue  of  Greece.  Indeed,  the  idea  of  solidarity  remains 
marginal  in  the  German  discourse  and,  when  mentioned,  it  is  always  associated  with 
responsibility  and  stability.  On  the  one  hand,  as  the  largest  and  economically  most 
significant member of the Eurozone, German leaders made clear that they felt responsible 
for the survival of the common currency. On the other hand, they were equally clear about 
the fact that the PIGS also had to commit themselves to policies that would allow for 
stabilizing the common currency. In Angela Merkel’s words, ‘stability and solidarity are 
two sides of the same coin’ (PC 26.03.10).  
 
The normative discourse and the appeal to values became even thinner in 2011 
compared to 2010. While Nicolas Sarkozy still referred to solidarity, albeit less often, the 
most salient frame in this respect was the idea of stability, which had long been most salient 
in the German discourse. The stability of the common currency had by now become the 
main normative guiding principle. Interestingly, Angela Merkel also referred to the German 
concept of Wohlstand as a secondary frame, i.e. the underlying idea of the German post-war 
economic miracle, making clear that what was really at stake with the Eurocrisis for the 
Germans was a threat to their standards of living and well-being. While this frame might 
have been quite efficient in the communicative discourse directed at the German domestic 
constituency, it naturally could not work as a legitimizing discourse at the European level.  
 
The  most  salient  normative  dimension  here  involves  the  different  assignation  of 
responsibility. This can be scrutinised through identity frames, i.e. the discursive references 
to actors depicted as protagonists (‘us’) or antagonists (‘them’) in the crisis, as shown in 
Graph 5. In the first months of 2010, the French President mainly put the blame on ‘the 
markets’ while pointing to speculators as common enemies for the Eurozone: ‘it is logical 
that a member country of the Euro that is being attacked by speculators, as it is the case of 
Greece today, should be able to rely on the solidarity of other members of the Eurozone. 
Otherwise, why did we decide to have a common currency?’ (PC 03.03.10). He pressured the 
German Chancellor while instrumentally appealing to her European commitment: ‘I believe 	 ﾠ
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in the European solidarity of Germany, I believe in Mrs Merkel’s European commitment’ 
(CP 07.03.2010). This is where Nicolas Sarkozy most clearly manages to profile himself as 
the ‘White Knight’ rescuing Greece.  
 
Graph 5 about here  
 
In contrast, Angela Merkel played the ‘Iron Lady,’ first stressing the lax budgetary 
policies of the PIGS as she insisted in a joint press conference early on in the crisis that: 
‘Greece  won't  be  left  alone,  but  there  are  rules  and  these  rules  must  be  adhered  to,’ 
(Washington Post February 12, 2010).  In March, she directly countered Sarkozy’s insistence 
that speculators were the problem, saying: “I would suggest that we should not assume that 
the situation was only caused by mean speculators (…) If the budget situation in Greece had 
not been what it was, the speculators would have not had such a chance. This is actually 
something that should not have taken place after the Treaty of Maastricht” (PC 26.03.10). 
The underlying idea among the German establishment and public was that the Greeks should 
be punished for cheating and then lying about the state of the country’s public finances. This 
position echoed the German public’s hostile stand on what was then seen as the “Greek 
crisis”. In February-March 2010, numerous opinion polls showed that about two thirds of 
German citizens opposed the idea of the federal government committing itself to financial 
help
6.  
 
In the same vein, the French and the German leaders disagreed with regard to the 
main protagonists in the crisis. For Nicolas Sarkozy, the PIGS countries were to be seen as 
allies, while integration was to be re-directed towards further convergence of a core Europe 
embodied by the Eurozone countries and led by intergovernmental institutions such as the 
Council of Ministers and the European Council and its permanent President.  
 
Graph 6 about here  
 
For the German Chancellor, in contrast, the banks were to be seen as allies rather than 
enemies. In the first sequence of the crisis, Angela Merkel also resisted the vision of a core 
Europe and insisted on moving forward with the 27 member states of the EU as a whole; she 
consistently referred to the leading role of the supranational institutions; the ECB, the EU 
Commission and the Court of Justice. Furthermore, while Nicolas Sarkozy was objecting to 	 ﾠ
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involvement of the IMF in the beginning, Angela Merkel insisted that a substantial part of the 
financial burden would be shared with the involvement of the IMF.  
 
The norm of stability was consistent with a framing of collective identities that 
focused  on  the  Eurozone,  in  particular  with  regard  to  the  view  of  antagonists  and 
protagonists in the crisis. First, the UK appeared as the main antagonist because of its veto 
and then refusal to adopt the Euro Plus Pact and the intergovernmental treaty; this was 
equally highlighted in both the French and German discourses. More interestingly, the gap 
between the French and the German framing of protagonists had closed to a significant 
extent  in  2011  when  compared  to  2010.  Nicolas  Sarkozy  still  emphasised  the  French-
German axis as a main protagonist more often than Angela Merkel, but the latter mentioned 
the Eurozone – as opposed to the EU 27 – and intergovernmental institutions more often 
than she had in the previous year. This accounts for a relative convergence towards the new 
intergovernmental governance mechanisms advocated by France in the Eurozone.  In turn, 
the Commission and the ECB became much more salient in the French discourse than the 
intergovernmental institutions. Similarly, the discursive patterns converged with regard to 
the role of the IMF and the banks as allies for the Eurozone countries in the crisis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In  the  complex  set  of  discursive  interactions  that  defined  the  Franco-German 
partnership in 2010 and 2011 during the Eurozone crisis, there was a lot of give and take on 
both sides.  However, if we were to be pushed to make a final assessment of the exercise, 
we would conclude that Germany, for all the criticism of Chancellor Merkel as the ‘Iron 
Lady’ unwilling to take action in solidarity with Eurozone members under pressure from 
the markets, won out over Sarkozy, as the ‘White Knight’ ready to ride out in defence of 
the weaker member-states.  This comes our clearly in the final table (see Table 1), when we 
consider how much of the German discourse on policy ideas and solutions, programmatic 
ideas and paradigms, and principles and values was taken up by the French leadership.   
 
The  fact  that  this  discourse  has  supported  austerity  policies  across  Europe  and, 
indeed, has locked European leaders into maintaining such policies for fear of a loss of 
credibility with the markets and of electoral support from their domestic constituencies, has 
had serious economic consequences.  Eurozone economies have slowed, while the PIGS 
have been sliding into recession.  It is true that growth has now become a new buzzword.  	 ﾠ
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But with austerity budgets linked to rapid deficit reduction still the main game in town, one 
wonders how European leaders expect to promote growth, and where the money will come 
from,  given  the  continued  resistance  by  Chancellor  Merkel  to  real  financial  solidarity, 
through  Eurobonds,  using  the  ECB  as  a  lender  of  last  resort,  or  even  increasing  the 
firepower of the loan guarantee mechanisms.  It is clear that change has begun with the 
appointment of Italian Prime Minister Monti in November 2011 and the election of French 
President Hollande in 2012.  But it may very well be that only a further change in leaders 
and parties, with a move from conservative to social democrats in major national political 
posts, will allow for a change in discourse and action.  But this would mean that the social 
democrats would also have to develop new ideas and discourse capable of changing the 
minds of the markets, by now fixed on stability and growth—an impossible combination. 	 ﾠ
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Graph 1 : Economic policy solutions 
 
   
 
 
 
Graph 2 : Institutional policy solutions 
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Graph 3 : Paradigms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4 : Norms and values 
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Graph 5 : Protagonists 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6 : Antagonists 
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Table	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ	 ﾠDiscursive	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠand	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ FRANCE	 ﾠ GERMANY	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠideas:	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
solutions	 ﾠ
Greek	 ﾠbail	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
EFSF	 ﾠ+	 ﾠEMS	 ﾠ
Fiscal	 ﾠharmonization	 ﾠ
EBC	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠ(debt	 ﾠ
monetization)	 ﾠ
Fiscal	 ﾠharmonization	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Sanctions	 ﾠ
IMF	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠsector	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠ
Investment	 ﾠin	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠIdeas:	 ﾠ	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠ
Gouvernement	 ﾠéconomique	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Golden	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
Programmatic	 ﾠIdeas:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Programs	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠparadigms	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Convergence	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Growth	 ﾠ&	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠ
Competitiveness	 ﾠ
Conditionality	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Growth	 ﾠ&	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
Philosophical	 ﾠIdeas:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Principles,	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠ
Solidarity	 ﾠ
Peace	 ﾠ
Stability	 ﾠ
Responsibility	 ﾠ
Wohlstand	 ﾠ
Antagonists	 ﾠ The	 ﾠmarkets/speculators	 ﾠ
UK	 ﾠ
PIGS	 ﾠ
UK	 ﾠ
Protagonists	 ﾠ The	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠFrench-ﾭ‐German	 ﾠaxis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Intergovernmental	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
PIGS	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Supranational	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
IMF	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ  	 ﾠ
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1	 ﾠ	 ﾠNaturally,	 ﾠother	 ﾠEU	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠto	 ﾠpropose,	 ﾠmediate,	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠ
compromise,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠoppose.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠordinarily	 ﾠline	 ﾠup	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠplayer,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Northern	 ﾠEuropeans	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠunfolded,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠEuropeans	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠ
France.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠagree,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠagreement.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠ“Sondage:	 ﾠplus	 ﾠd’un	 ﾠfrançais	 ﾠsur	 ﾠdeux	 ﾠapprouve	 ﾠla	 ﾠRègle	 ﾠd’or”,	 ﾠ25.08.2011,	 ﾠwww.lepoint.fr	 ﾠ(20.03.2012)	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ«	 ﾠrigueur	 ﾠ»	 ﾠis	 ﾠavoided	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
negative	 ﾠconnotation,	 ﾠKonsolidierung	 ﾠis	 ﾠprefered	 ﾠto	 ﾠSparkurs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠdiscourse.	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠone	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠwage	 ﾠindexation	 ﾠon	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠhad	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
few	 ﾠyears	 ﾠin	 ﾠFrance.	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠare	 ﾠmassively	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacquisitions	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreek	 ﾠproximity	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
€79	 ﾠbn	 ﾠversus	 ﾠ€43	 ﾠbn	 ﾠfor	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠbanks.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠPortugal.	 ﾠCf	 ﾠElie	 ﾠCohen,	 ﾠ«	 ﾠGrèce	 ﾠ:	 ﾠnuages	 ﾠnoirs	 ﾠsur	 ﾠles	 ﾠbanques	 ﾠ
françaises	 ﾠ»,	 ﾠ Telos,	 ﾠ 02.05.2010,	 ﾠ http://www.telos-ﾭ‐
eu.com/fr/article/grece_nuages_noirs_sur_les_banques_francaises	 ﾠ(12.05.2011)	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/77453/umfrage/finanzielle-ﾭ‐hilfen-ﾭ‐der-ﾭ‐bundesregierung-ﾭ‐
fuer-ﾭ‐griechenland/,	 ﾠ February	 ﾠ 2010.	 ﾠ “Bürger	 ﾠ stützen	 ﾠ harten	 ﾠ Kurs	 ﾠ gegen	 ﾠ Griechenland”,	 ﾠ www.stern.de,	 ﾠ
30.03.2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ